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Though there are many ways of describing markers of creativity, one of the most persuasive 
was one of the earliest we encountered:  the ability to tolerate ambiguity.  It is precisely that 
ambiguity, valued in the arts for its richness of interpretive possibility, that is perhaps most at 
risk in the current sector and institutional climate of imposed order. An insistence on a rigidly 
enforced language of learning outcomes seems to value tidiness and clarity over the 
excitement and engagement of open-ended exploration. An emerging pedagogical correctness 
(focusing on easily assessable and quantifiable outcomes) threatens invention and critical 
questioning as not only an aim for students but also for teachers as part of the task of 
developing engagement with the culture of a specific discipline. 
 
This paper will, first, explore the idea of tolerance of ambiguity through the history of its 
critical discussion and relation to notions of metaphor and imagination.  It will then look at 
the history and experience of participants in one specific group exercise designed to address 
issues of ambiguity, categorization and organisation.  This exercise, drawing on the 
recognition of and imaginative connection between properties of natural objects, has been 
used widely in a range of educational and developmental settings with sometimes startling 
and certainly memorable results.  It may not always, however, be seen as conforming to 
current demands for rigid clarity of intentions and learning outcomes, and can raise issues of 
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the legitimacy of questioning, surprise and hidden agendas as pedagogical strategies and 
prompts to imaginative leaps. 
 
Finally, it will contextualise this discussion by looking in a broader way at the tone of 
imposed order in pedagogical literature, its application in e-learning methodology, and the 





Anti-Creativity, Ambiguity and the Imposition of Order 
 
 
I. Tolerance of Ambiguity 
 
Much of the psychological literature on creativity, whether in formal academic research 
papers or popular handbooks, sets out markers to identify this mysterious and desirable 
quality.  These lists vary, but a typical one might include such qualities as: originality, 
curiosity, playfulness, capacity for fantasy, divergent thinking, risk-taking, intuitive, 
emotional, openness to new experience. In the 50‟s, Guilford identified three factors based on 
his analyses of „thinking interests: divergent thinking (a search that uncovers several 
answers), convergent thinking (thinking through to one correct answer, and one that has 
tended to appear in most subsequent lists, a willingness to accept uncertainty and avoidance of 
rigidity or: „tolerance of ambiguity‟(Guilford 1950).  Some lists separate into categories of 
cognitive styles, conative variables, and personality traits; „tolerance for ambiguity‟ is usually 
included in the latter grouping.  Torrance‟s early tests for identifying creativity included this, 
as did many subsequent lists. (Torrance 1974). Sometimes even its absence is noteworthy. In 
a recent collection of creativity studies in international settings, it is the one of two main 
markers noted by a Korean study as „missing‟ in the population of their test groups. 
(Kaufman&Steinberg 2006) 
 
Tolerance of ambiguity is one of Sternberg and Lubart‟s „five attributes‟, one of Davis‟s 
„sixteen traits‟, and though not explicitly mentioned as one of Root-Bernstein‟s „thirteen 
tools‟, is crucial to their stress on the role of imaginative metaphorical and analogical thinking  
as a  key factor in creative thinking. (Sternberg&Lubart 1995; Davis 1975; Root-Bernstein 
1999)  In another context, and much earlier, as Martindale pointed out, poet Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge had already noted that „creativity required the ability to “exist in ambiguity” or to 
tolerate disorder‟. (Martindale 1990)  
 
This capacity to tolerate ambiguity, which links with complexity and novelty, is deemed 
essential in the sense that creative problem solving involves an ambiguous period in which the 
problem is clarified and solutions considered.  (Some examples in these studies may seem 
odd, for instance Barron and Welsh‟s „classic demonstration‟ that „creative persons‟ preferred 
„smudgy, complex, asymmetrical drawings over simple and balanced ones‟, or the suggestion 
elsewhere that the attraction to fantasy and novelty was manifested in the finding that 
„creative people‟ tended to be „stronger believers in psychical phenomena and flying saucers, 
despite their generally higher intelligence level‟ (Barron 1969). 
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The tendency of early studies to find that creative individuals tended to have a high tolerance 
for ambiguity was accompanied by a further observation that „creative individuals might 
deliberately seek ambiguities and use the setting up of ambiguities as an important part of the 
creative process,‟ identifying this as a strategic tool, or perhaps simply reflecting the 
dialectical nature of thinking. Other variations reinforced the idea. Bruner observed that 
„creative outcomes often occur as a result of resolving ambiguities.‟ (Glover, Ronning & 
Reynolds 1989).   Koestler suggested that creativity often involves not a combination of 
isolated elements but a connection of „two entire matrices of thought‟. (Koestler 1964) 
Amabile stressed the priority of heuristic solutions (no known recipe) over the methodical 
clarity of algorithmic formulae. (Amabile, 1983). 
 
Some accounts stress the emotional (and professional) consequences of not being able to hold 
two simultaneous ideas in suspension long enough to solve particular problems. In tolerating 
ambiguity, it is necessary to withstand the uncertainty and chaos that result when the problem 
is not clearly defined or when it is unclear how the pieces of the solution are going to come 
together.  Invoking Lavoisier, Sternberg and Lubart point out that „relationships in transition 
are ambiguous…fumbling rather than working according to plan.  Ambiguity is 
uncomfortable and anxiety provoking‟ (Sternberg&Lubart,1995).  In order to optimize 
creative potential, there is a need to tolerate the discomfort of an ambiguous situation long 
enough so that what is produced is the best possible solution.  A recurrent example is Linus 
Pauling‟s work on the double helix, which he published before he had the complete solution 
that Watson and Crick were able to find by building on the earlier work.  „If Pauling had 
tolerated ambiguity just a little longer, he might have been the first to discover the correct 
structure of DNA.‟ (Sternberg&Lubart, 1995) 
 
Prefiguring the specific focus on the role of ambiguity tolerance in psychological studies of 
creativity, literary theorist William Empson‟s 1930 study of poetic ambiguity, Seven Types of 
Ambiguity, explored variations on the effects of multiple metaphorical meanings. In this 
classification, an instance of ambiguity could: 
 
1. make a detail effective in several ways at once;  
2. resolve two or more alternative meanings into one;   
3. present two apparently unconnected meaning simultaneously;  
4. show the complicated state of mind in the author through alternative meanings, 
5. present a „fortunate confusion‟ as the author discovers his idea in the act of writing;  
6. force a reader to invent interpretations through the irrelevance or contradiction of what 
is said; or  
7. mark a complete division through a full contradiction.   
 
Psychoanalyst Ernst Kris noted how Empson showed the ways in which aesthetic experience 
is enriched by the multiplicity of meanings in poetic language.  Metaphor may also serve as 
an instrument for multiplying ambiguity; the relation between elements themselves 
ambiguous to some degree generates a new and larger range of significance.  Moreover, the 
relation serves at the same time as a mechanism for integration, indicating the direction along 
which unification of the multiple meanings is to be achieved. In short, ambiguity functions in 
poetry, not as a carrier of a content which is somehow in itself poetic, but as the instrument by 
which a content is made poetic through the process of re-creation. (Empson 1930; Kris 1953) 
 
Extending the consideration of ambiguity to visual images, Dario Gamboni has explored the 
ways in which ambiguous combinations suggest the character of what is susceptible to several 
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interpretations.  This expresses the character of „what belongs to two categories, what lacks 
precision and disturbs.‟  His examples range from Archimboldo‟s heads composed of multiple 
objects, to popular optical illusions offering dual readings like the duck-rabbit or the 
alternately-old-and-young woman, and includes works which, like Jasper Johns‟ „Spring‟ take 
illusion and multiple readings as explicit subjects. (Gamboni 2002)  It might be conjectured 
that the whole history of representation involves multiple readings in which a  wall, a fresco 
or a canvas is necessarily perceived ambiguously as both the ground that carries the image 
and what the image represents. James Elkins drew particularly on Empson‟s fourth category 
as a demonstration of a „confusion of palimpsestic indecisions.‟  He notes Kris‟ comment that 
ambiguity plays a central role in both creation and communication of art, the latter‟s success 
depending on setting in motion a process analogous to that of the former. (Elkins 1999) 
 
II The ‘Sticks’ Exercise 
 
These accounts suggest that the notion of ambiguity informs creative practice in a range of 
ways.  By looking in detail at the process of a specific group exercise that seems to build on 
this notion of multiple meanings, we want to explore how the linked notions of tolerance of 
ambiguity and creativity may have informed its development, though it was not at all 
designed with those concepts in mind.  Ingredients of play and collective fantasy, also 
identified as markers of creativity, may also have been key to its effectiveness. 
 
This exercise evolved from an experiment in team teaching a group of mature students on a 
certificate course in art and design.  Most of this group, despite having had extremely 
competent careers and experience of managing complex family structures, were having 
difficulty with the theoretical studies requirements for writing, and in particular with 
structuring essays.  In attempting to find visual metaphors for the processes of organising 
ideas in writing, we started with straightforward sorting of categories of objects (representing 
facts and ideas) in hierarchies to represent the structure of ideas composing arguments in 
writing.  
 
This initial exercise was not designed beforehand, but emerged spontaneously as a result of a 
visual dialogue between the two tutors running the theoretical studies component of the 
course.  We began, in a playful way, to use common objects that everyone might have with 
them, in this instance, bags or briefcases, and to pair and sort them based on similarities of 
shape, colour, or function.  The need to identify explicit criteria for sorting made the point 
effectively that different kinds of organisation were possible depending on the applied criteria 
and that overlapping criteria required decisions.  At some point in this process, some of the 
participants discovered that assigning personal names to the bags could stand for a collection 
of qualities and became a kind of shorthand in the process both of giving a sense of overall 
shape and character and enabling the sorting process.  A sleek Swedish aluminium briefcase 
became „Sven‟; a soft rainbow-knitted shopping bag was christened „Rosie‟.  The visual and 
tactile qualities that emerged in the naming process allowed sorting, categorization, and 
arranging in sequences to be addressed in a familiar way, using existing associations as 
markers. That these decisions were collective and debated was an important part of the 
process. 
 
This initial experiment in representing structures of written ideas with available visual shapes, 
was the starting point for a more elaborate version of this exercise in another institutional 
setting. This has since been used in a variety of student and staff development contexts with 
remarkably memorable and socially cohesive effects.  The setting, a large country house in 
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attractive wooded grounds, offered readily available (free!) learning materials, in this case, 
fallen sticks. Instructions for the exercise were given in the following way: You have 10 
minutes to find a fallen stick that you like the look of. Initial disbelief gave way to playful 
or sometimes slightly reluctant compliance with the instruction.   Demands for immediate 
explanation of „desired outcomes‟ were resisted.  Participants were asked to trust that there 
was a serious point to the exercise, but that it might work less effectively if explained in detail 
beforehand.  Working with the mystery of unintended outcomes was key. 
 
1. Bring it back to the group.  The initial effect was puzzlement giving way to genuine 
interest as they became intrigued by the range of interpretive choice evident in what 
was brought back.  This occasionally gave way to general hilarity and the kinds of 
objects, ranging from tiny broken twigs, to massive branches, (once almost a whole 
tree!), while the interpretation of „stick‟ expanded to include mops, brooms and 
pencils.  It was important to ask that the group trusted our intentions; we explained 
that we had good reasons for suspending explanations, and that it was important to 
experience, for the moment, the discomfort of the ambiguity.  Already even the 
sceptical had begun to enjoy the exercise, as they noted possible connections between 
personalities and choices, whether predictable or unlikely. There was general laughter, 
once they had managed to suspend disbelief. 
 
2. Naming. Round 1:  Seated so that everyone could see the stick and the owner, 
participants were asked to make decisions about the stick they had chosen, which were 
revealed to the group.  They were asked:  ‘If your stick had a human name, what 
would it be?‟  We suggested that they avoid the literal „Twiggy‟ or „Woody‟ and go 
with the first „real‟ name association that occurred to them on the basis of the 
appearance of the stick. 
 
3. Naming. Round 2: ‘ If your stick went to evening classes, what would it sign up 
for?’ Again we tried to avoid the obvious connections of „woodwork‟ and „forestry‟.  
This proved easy for most, and remarkably specific associations readily developed the 
unusual personalities and interests of the shape-evoked names e.g. calligraphy, oceanic 
studies, Italian cooking, theology. 
 
4. Naming. Round 3: ‘What radio station does he/she listen to?’  By this time, the 
group was becoming familiar with the emerging personalities of „Fred‟, „Sergio‟, 
„Penelope, and „Kwame‟ and their „personal‟ likes and dislikes. They appeared to 
enjoy the play of the exercise, and began to contribute enthusiastically to the collective 
fantasy that was emerging.  Even the shy were able to participate, as there was no 
judgement of right or wrong at stake, and extremely interesting responses about 
personal associations with names and cultural difference emerged. And as with all 
exercises, permission was given for „the right to remain silent‟, which, paradoxically, 
usually ensured that everyone participated. 
 
5. Pairing: ‘If your stick (but by now usually named) wanted to spend an evening 
with another in the group, who would it be and what would they do/where would 
they go?’  With surprisingly little trouble, we learned that the delicate, graceful 
Andrea and Emily who listen to Radio 3 would be attending the ballet, and that Capital 
addicts, straightforward, rugged Tom and Bert, would going for a pint at their local.  
The awareness of stereotypes was conscious and acknowledged in informal but 
explicit ways.  Now side by side, the sticks‟ visual similarities and shared formal 
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characteristics were evident without explanation as the source of the associations and 
the collective fantasy.  (An interesting feature of this whole process is that the 
projected characters rarely seemed to be self-portraits, and there was often general 
confirmation of the appropriate matching of names and shapes, while offering up 
cultural assumptions for discussion.) 
 
6. Sudden switch of context to transform the interpretation of the object: 
Participants were divided into groups of five or six, and asked to think differently 
about the original sticks, now invested with personalities and histories in the collective 
story woven about them, by being asked to „forget‟ or „suspend‟ the assigned identities 
and to think of them purely as visual forms and physical objects. These they are asked 
to organize into an orderly sequence, agreeing the criteria, making decisions about 
classifications, categories and sequences within the chosen organisation, while also 
noticing the group dynamic involved in the decision-making.  They of course 
discovered in the process, that deliberate „forgetting‟ is harder than they imagined, and 
that they often referred to the stick‟s „name‟ in the process.  Here they were 
experiencing the ambiguity of holding two or more possibly contradictory 
interpretations in mind at the same time. 
 
7. Establishing and recognising criteria for sorting:  When final arrangements were 
agreed, each group‟s „order‟ was shown to the rest of the groups, who were asked to 
try to identify the criteria for organisation into classifications/categories and 
sequences, e.g. length, texture, diameter, colour, degree of complexity. 
 
8. Final question:  ‘What might this have to do with writing?’ This led to discussion 
of the difficulty of arriving at clear structures to inform written argument, the variable 
alternatives for order in writing and of the ways in which play with visual diagrams 
representing alternative possibilities might be helpful.   
 
What happened in this exercise? A great deal more than the sum of the parts. There had been 
collective storytelling, playful interaction, imaginative engagement with analogical thinking, 
the development of a shared culture with a language whose created meanings were 
recognisable only to the participants (many reported the difficulty of explaining at home what 
went on in the session).  Only this group could understand; it became social glue, a common 
point of reference for the rest of their time together, and could be used as a shorthand for all 
the discussions that emerged.  These have varied from group to group, but all have 
encompassed issues of inclusivity and gender, the importance of shared values, the crucial and 
problematic nature of establishing agreed criteria, and the difficulty of absolute clarity.  For 
the tutors, it elicited important information about the dynamics of a group and capacities of 
individuals.  If our belief that it is important to find out as much as possible about a group in 
order to identify starting points and associations to inform ways of working with that group is 
true, then this kind of approach could become an extremely important diagnostic tool.   
 
The effects have been striking.  The relaxed tone broke down barriers, and helped include the 
resistant.  It created a setting for easy social collaboration.  The simple permission to enjoy a 
task that was also an effective learning strategy with a serious point was unusual and 
welcome.  The exercise has repeatedly been the one that participants recall for years 
afterward, often recapturing specific details of the personalities created during the session. We 
still recall vivid details of many of these attributes. Perhaps the most delightful was a quiet, 
restrained law lecturer who returned in fits of giggles with huge distorted branch stuck up the 
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sleeve of his suit jacket: „This…‟ he cried with eerie glee, „is Boris!‟.  Another let his modest 
stick („Roger‟) deliver a final power-point presentation; the stick‟s portrait appeared in every 
slide of „Roger‟s Guide to the Isle of Mull‟.   
 
It is also a setting that, like the linked domains of metaphors, encourages the holding in mind 
of simultaneous contrasting meanings.  This is, we would argue, an example of a process that 
demands an emergent „tolerance of ambiguity‟ in the development of an understanding of 
alternate possibilities of sequence and order.  Could strategies deliberately using exercises that 
involve markers of creativity become tools to develop creativity?  
 
This exercise revealed further creativity traits, though „openness to experience, ability to 
make imaginative links, and willingness to play‟ could perhaps be seen as implied 
components of a tolerance for ambiguity.  The element of play seemed particularly important, 
not only for its socially cohesive effects in the group.  Amabile considers this trait in her 
account of groups of children who were either „trained in play‟ or allowed to engage in make-
believe play before the creativity testing.  This study (which incidentally also involved play 
with sticks) demonstrated the facilitative effects of play on creativity.  One group was allowed 
time to play with blocks and sticks before the testing session began.  Other children either 
received training for the task or proceeded directly to testing.  The study showed that free play 
facilitated creativity, not only because play gave children the opportunity to discover new 
properties of objects, but also because play stimulated fantasy which encouraged creativity, 
suggesting that „engaging in fantasy might, in itself, lead to increases in creativity‟. (Amabile 
1996)  
 
III. Order and Disorder 
 
An initial aim of the „Sticks‟ exercise was to explore possible processes of organising and 
ordering, whether of objects or ideas, in relation to writing. The „tolerance of ambiguity‟ 
involved in this ordering process is sometimes described (for instance, in indices) as 
„tolerance of disorder‟.  While it may be comforting to the habitually untidy to see „disorder‟ 
as a marker of creativity, the two terms suggest quite different conceptions and processes. 
Forms of order that evolve through a creative process of considering multiple possibilities for 
structuring, a complex „emergent‟  order, seem quite different in origin and intent from the 
rigid imposition of a predetermined orderly system of the kind that characterise some higher 
education systems.  
  
What we are faced with in some university structures, where the experienced order may seem 
one of constraint and prescriptiveness, suggests the oppressive shadow of the kind of flexible 
and responsive order we have been describing, Mary Evans has stressed its effects in Killing 
Thinking. (Evans 2004). Her introduction quotes Nicholas Royle: 
 
In British universities all teaching is judged (by a sort of spectral, invisible or 
scarcely visible body of authorities) in terms of „learning outcomes‟.  As a teacher 
one is obliged to act and feel like a sort of automaton, someone concerned with 
„delivery of unit‟ (rather than „teaching of course‟) the outcome of which should 
be specifiable in advance.  Teaching is becoming mechanized in a way that makes 
caricature seem improbably realistic:  Dickens‟ Mr Gradgrind would have found it 
difficult to believe.  It is not only the teacher who becomes an automaton, but also 
the student, for he or she too is obliged to live up to the „learning outcomes‟ set 
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down in advance, in other words not to live at all, merely to receive delivery.  
(Evans 2002) 
 
A similarly imposed prescriptive order can be seen in what Tamsin Haggis describes as the 
„official discourse of mainstream pedagogical theory in higher education‟.  In a recent paper 
exploring the effects of the centrality of the „approaches to learning/conceptions of learning‟ 
model, she notes the lack of analysis and debate in relation to these conceptual models and the 
narrowness of the range of models used. She underscores the problematic nature of the now 
widespread use of the sharp distinction between „deep‟ and „surface‟ learning, suggesting that 
the tentative conclusions of the original Marton and Saljo research on „approaches‟ have been 
reified by reducing the terms to „deep learners‟ and „surface learners‟. (Though the third term 
„strategic‟ has sometimes been added, this refers to an alternation between the two positions, 
and not a distinct third term.) We are left with a misleading binary opposition. (Haggis 2003) 
 
While elaborations of this straightforward opposition have added more steps and distinctions 
in „observable learning outcomes‟, the frameworks still appear prescriptive. Haggis notes that 
attempts to „induce‟ deep learning have been shown to sometimes have the opposite effect of 
creating an increase in surface approaches‟. The now widely promoted notion of „constructive 
alignment‟ of teaching methods, assessment tasks and classroom climate with intended 
learning outcomes are described as intended to „trap‟ students into engaging with appropriate 
„deep‟ approaches. She argues that these polarised notions have been adopted in attempts to 
categorize students as one or the other, and, further, that the aims of promoting „deep 
learning‟ as desirable, reflect academics‟ (rather than students‟) aspirations.  
 
While accepting that there may be commonalities in approach, it is also important to ask how 
differences in the context of individual lives affects modes of learning. She urges further for a 
need „to try to understand learning as an individual and situated process‟ and to „explore the 
„shadows‟ cast by mainstream pedagogical research.  It is arguably, she concludes, at least 
partly the unnamed and unexpected factors and interrelationships involved in „learning‟ which 
deterministic probabilistic models cannot take account of, that are likely to be the cause of 
unpredictable outcomes‟. (Haggis 2004) 
 
In a similar vein, Andy Northedge suggests that students need „organised excursions into their 
specialist discourse communities.‟ He argues that: 
 
„the development of the student‟s writing voice is critical.  To become a speaker 
of a discourse is to acquire a new identity as a member of that discourse 
community.  A central struggle throughout studenthood is to establish a voice 
and an identity as a legitimate speaker/writer within the specialist community.  
This approach to assignment writing sits uncomfortably with contemporary calls 
for tightly specified course outcomes and detailed performance criteria.  
Nevertheless, it enables profound learning and highly meaningful assessment, 
because it reflects the ambiguities and indeterminacy in what is fundamentally a 





This paper originated in our curiosity about why a particular group exercise had become so 
memorably useful.  Exploring some strands of the creativity literature has reinforced our 
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initial feeling that the notion of „tolerance of ambiguity‟ could help explain its effectiveness. 
We have seen that this trait often appears among the attributes of creative persons.  The notion 
of ambiguity itself is a powerful force in the arts, offering the richness of multiple 
interpretations; as Elkins asks, „why are our pictures puzzles?‟  Could deliberate play with the 
ambiguity of pictorial or verbal language operate as a conscious imaginative strategy? 
In an academic culture that values cogent thinking and clarity of argument, it is interesting to 
speculate about the imaginatively untidy origins of some of those orderly arguments. 
Scientific discoveries, we learn, can result from random flights of metaphorical connection or 
spontaneous, conflicting images.  Einstein famously imagined himself hurtling through the 
heavens astride a light beam. Simonton describes creativity as a „constrained stochastic 
process‟. The term „stochastic‟, literally „conjectural‟, suggests much more uncertainty and 
unpredictability than would be expected from a forthright, rational process.  At the same time, 
he claims, to hold that creativity is stochastic is not tantamount to the assertion that it is totally 
random and therefore capricious and illogical.  He argues that creativity has the characteristics 
of „constrained stochastic behavior‟.  (Simonton 2004)   Mary Evans reminds us that „debate, 
discussion and even disruption do provide interest and inspiration and it is often the less well-
ordered context which gives rise to the more creative work.‟ (Evans 2004) 
 
The challenge may be to respond creatively to the unwelcome constraints of imposed systems, 
less by resisting them than by finding ways of working personally and imaginatively within 
them. If we can tolerate the ambiguity of the (insoluble?) problem of working within systems 
that often seem to function as anti-creative forces, this approach may offer strategies that 
could help us live with the discomfort of the situation. We can, for example, widen the debate 
about the nature and effects of imposed order.  We can encourage the use of more subtle 
pedagogical analyses and approaches.  While radically shifting current patterns is difficult, we 
may be able to reshape students‟ experiences by drawing on other models. As Haggis 
suggests, the discourses of complexity may allow, like emergent growth of communities and 
architectures, the growth of forms of organisation that resemble the structures and functions 
of imposed order, but differ fundamentally in conception. In revaluing the personal, collective 
and face-to-face force of collective negotiations of meaning, ambiguity may serve as a 
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